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PAGE 01 STATE 069924 220419Z
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 069924

E.O. 12356: DECL: 03/13/05

TAGS: MARR, PREL, AORC, UN, RW

SUBJECT: UNAMIR FORCECOM'S ASSESSMENT

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PAGE 02 STATE 069924 220419Z

1. (C) VERY INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS HAVE BEGUN ON UNAMIR'S

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FORCE STRENGTH, COMPOSITION AND MISSION IN RWANDA
PROMPTED IN PART BY THE PERCEPTION OF INCREASING FRICTION
BETWEEN UNAMIR AND RPA PERSONNEL, BUT ALSO DRIVEN BY COST
CONCERNS. WE ARE BEGINNING TO LOOK AHEAD TOWARDS UNAMIR'S
MANDATE RENEWAL IN EARLY JUNE. A "ZERO-BASED" REVIEW IS
WARRANTED, THOUGH IT SEEMS THAT UNAMIR'S CONTINUED
PRESENCE IS VITAL AND RWANDA'S SITUATION WOULD BE FAR
WORSE WITHOUT UNAMIR TROOPS AND OBSERVERS. UNAMIR MAY
ALSO HAVE A STABILIZING EFFECT ON BURUNDI, BY REDUCING
ETHNIC CONFLICT BETWEEN TUTSIS AND HUTUS IN RWANDA

2 . (C) FOR KIGALI: WE ARE INTERESTED IN HAVING UNAMIR
FORCECOM MG TOUSIGNANT'S UNVARNISHED, UNFILTERED, MOST
REALISTIC THOUGHTS ON HIS TIME IN COUNTRY THUS FAR AND
HIS THOUGHTS ON ALL ASPECTS OF UNAMIR'S FUTURE. YOU
SHOULD QUERY HIM SPECIFICALLY ABOUT A) HIS THOUGHTS ON
UNAMIR'S FUTURE ROLE (SPECIFIC MISSIONS HE INTENDS TO
CONDUCT AND HOW HE PRIORITIZES THEM); B) UNAMIR'S CURRENT
MANDATE (IS IT CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD BY BOTH UNAMIR AND THE

GOR; SHOULD IT BE ALTERED IF IT IS TO HAVE A MORE POSITIVE
EFFECT?); C) UNAMIR'S COMPOSITION (BOTH BY NATIONAL
CONTINGENT AND TYPE -- I.E., OBSERVERS, TROOPS -- OF
PERSONNEL); D) THE EXTENT OF ANY FRICTION WITH THE
GOR/RPA; AND E) ABSOLUTE NUMBERS (CAN FORCE STRENGTH BE
REDUCED? IF SO. WITH WHAT REPERCUSSIONS -- E.G., WOULD A
REDUCTION IN TROOPS IMPLY AN INCREASE IN MILITARY
OBSERVERS? SHOULD FORCE STRENGTH POSSIBLY INCREASE?). MG
TOUSIGNANT'S VIEWS ON UNAMIR'S POLITICAL SITUATION SHOULD
BE SOUGHT, PARTICULARLY REGARDING THE GOR'S SENSITIVITIES
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PAGE 03 STATE 069924 220419Z
ABOUT THE PERCEIVED EFFECT OF A CONTINUING UN PRESENCE ON
THEIR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. HIS VIEWS ON THE EFFECTS OF
UNAMIR'S PRESENCE IN THE REGION PARTICULARLY ANY
PERCEPTION OF INFLUENCE ON STABILITY IN BURUNDI, WOULD
ALSO BE WELCOME.

3. (C) ALSO FOR KIGALI: DATT IS ENCOURAGED TO PROVIDE --
SEPARATELY FROM REPORT IN PARAGRAPH TWO ABOVE -- HIS OWN
VIEWS ON WHAT KIND OF FORCE UNAMIR WILL NEED BEYOND JUNE 9.

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4. (C) FOR USUN: MISSION IS REQUESTED TO ASSIGN DPA AND
DPKO AT THE WORKING LEVEL WITH THE SAME QUESTIONS.
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